larlet-fr-david/david/2024/_sources/2024-04-02 - Porte.md

# Porte

> [en] For me, the two big lessons from #XZ were first, the lack of resources supporting crucial Open-Source infrastructure, but then and especially, the demonstration that the attackers are numerous, skilled *and patient*. We already knew about numerous and skilled but this episode, where the attacker was already well-embedded in the project by May 2022, opened a few eyes, including mine.
>
> The advantage, to various flavors of malefactor, of subverting core pieces of Open-Source infrastructure, is incalculable. ==#XZ was the one we caught; how many have we missed?==
> 
> <cite>*[ongoing by Tim Bray · OSQI](https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/202x/2024/04/01/OSQI)*</cite>

J’ai laissé le web 2 jours et hop, une [porte dérobée](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porte_d%C3%A9rob%C3%A9e) a été fermée à temps. C’est [la chronologie](https://boehs.org/node/everything-i-know-about-the-xz-backdoor) qui est surprenante dans sa durée et pose immédiatement la question de savoir s’il s’agit d’une exception ou s’il y a déjà des portes un peu partout, exploitées par plus ou moins de monde.

Lorsqu’on voit ce que [sont prêts à faire les GAFAM+](/david/2024/03/28/#hr-140), je n’ai aucun doute sur le fait qu’ils se rueraient sur de telles « opportunités ». On parle souvent de malveillance dans ces cas là, je pense que l’on peut facilement mettre tout ce qui est *growth hacking* et *marketing* dans ce périmètre.

Pour en revenir à des OSQI (Open Source Quality Institutes) nationaux, cela me rappelle des initiatives comme [copie publique](https://copiepublique.fr/) ou cette idée de [MécénatDeCompétencesPublic](/david/2023/01/11/) .

Transformer l’Open-Source en bien commun est peut-être le chantier de la décennie à venir. J’espère en faire partie à mon échelle.

> [en] Tuesday, Hans-Christoph Steiner, a longtime developer of F-Droid, explained that a very similar situation nearly led F-Droid to push an update that would have introduced a security vulnerability into the product three years ago: “Three years ago, F-Droid had a similar kind of attempt as the Xz backdoor,” he posted on Mastodon. “A new contributor submitted a merge request to improve the search, which was oft requested but the maintainers hadn’t found time to work on. There was also pressure from other random accounts to merge it. In the end, it became clear that it added a SQL injection vulnerability. In this case, we managed to catch it before it was merged. Since similar tactics were used, I think it’s relevant now.”
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> Other open source developers and security experts have pointed to the dynamic of bullying and the general reliance on a small number of volunteer developers. They explained that it’s a problem across much of the open source software ecosystem, and is definitely a problem for the large tech companies and infrastructure who rely on these often volunteer-led projects to build their for-profit software on top of. 
>
> <cite>*[Bullying in Open Source Software Is a Massive Security Vulnerability](https://www.404media.co/xz-backdoor-bullying-in-open-source-software-is-a-massive-security-vulnerability/)*</cite>

#commun #opensource #protopie